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ABSTRACT Delay tolerant networks (DTNs) are a special type of intermittently connected networks (ICN)
featured by variable delay, frequent disruption, asymmetric data rates, and high-error rates. The DTNs have
been primarily developed for interplanetary networks (IPNs), however, it shows applicability to challenged
networks. Thus, solutions devised for security and routing for traditional networks do not apply to DTNs due
to its unique nature. Moreover, this paper shows less attention particularly in security and its related strings.
In DTNs, malicious nodes launch various attacks that include packet drop, a fake packet, and flood attack.
These attacks inevitably overuse scarce resources (bandwidth, buffer, and energy) in DTNs, which leads
to low packet delivery ratio and high packet loss ratio. Flood attack is listed in top among the challenging
attacks in DTNs. The existing techniques to confront flood attack suffered from high-detection time and
low-detection accuracy. This paper proposed novel resources efficient (distributed and intrusion detection
system-based) algorithms to mitigate flood attack. The simulation results show considerable improvement
in detection time, detection accuracy, and resource consumption, and also show enhanced packet delivery
ratio and reduced packet loss ratio.
INDEX TERMS Delay tolerant networks (DTNs), flood attack, misbehaving nodes, packet delivery ratio,
packet loss ratio and resources consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are type of
networks which suffer from frequent disconnection and
long/variable delay [1]–[3]. Initially, DTNs were proposed
for Deep Space Communication, commonly known as
Interplanetary Networks (IPNs) [4]. However, after suc-
cessful deployment in IPNs, DTNs are used for various
others terrestrial applications, such as Vehicular Ad-hoc
Networks (VANETs) [5], Underwater Wireless Sensor Net-
works (UWSNs) [6] and other challanged networks [7].
DTNs supporting heterogeneous networks, characterized
by long delay, network partitioning, and asymmetric data rate.
Bundles Protocol (BP) is proposed to solve the aforemen-
tioned issues of DTNs [8]. The DTNs node uses a custo-
dian forwarding mechanism i.e. Store-Carry-Forward (SCF)
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Tiago Cruz.
method to forwards bundles. [9]. The current issues
in DTNs reported in literature are; Reliability [10], [11],
Time Synchronization [10], [11], Node Management, Spoof
Identity [12], Privacy [13], Key Management [14], Storage
Management [15], and Resources Scarcity. The research area
of security paid less attention viz-a-viz routing [16] which is
the motivation behind this article.
The Bundle Security Protocol (BSP) has been proposed
to counter the security issues. However, BSP provides
some basic security services [17] and lack scenario/use-
cases based specific solutions. In DTNs, nodes are vul-
nerable to various security attacks i.e. Black Hole [18],
Packet Drops [19], Faulty Node [20], ColludingAttacks [21],
Fake Packet Attacks [22] and Distributed Denial of Service
(DDOS)/Flood Attacks [23].
In flood attack, the malicious node(s) forward a large
number of packets, which overuse the scarce resources
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of DTNs. The scarce resources include the buffer, band-
width, energy, and processing power. This attack leads
to, a decrease in the packet delivery ratios (PDR), con-
trary to the increase in packet loss ratios (PLR) and
node’s unavailability for service(s). The traditional rout-
ing protocols and detection/mitigation protocols pro-
posed for VANETs [24]–[26], Autonomous Vehicle [27],
UWSNs [28], [29], Internet [30], Internet of Things [31],
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) [32] and Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs) [33]–[35] do not apply directly in
DTNs.
The algorithms proposed in the literature to counter flood
attack suffered fromDetection time/detection delay, detection
rate/detection accuracy, high cost, and centrality (Centralized
algorithms in which one node is responsible for malicious
nodes detection) [36]–[39]. The above issues lead to Buffer
Consumption (BC), Bandwidth Consumption (BWC)/Total
Wasted Transmission (TWT) and Energy Consumption (EC)
that ultimately causes low PDR and high PLR. Researchers
proposed various algorithms to mitigates misbehaving nodes
which launches flood attacks (As mentioned earlier in this
article). This section discussed all the proposed algorithms to
mitigate flood attacks in DTNs.
The article [37] proposed an algorithm to mitigate flood
attacks in DTNs. The proposed algorithm, allocated less
memory space to malicious and more space to legitimate
nodes by deleting messages from the buffer. However, false
positive and false negative ratios are high in this algorithm
and only works for probabilistic routing protocol using his-
tory of encounter and transitivity (Prophet) [40], which is
obviously downside of the proposed algorithm. The [41]
proposed a centralized (In which one node is responsible
for detection) algorithm to mitigate flood attacks in DTNs.
In the proposed algorithm, every node share has memory pic-
ture to centralized Gate-Way-Node. Gate-Way-Node counts
the number of packets of every node. If node violates the
threshold (Pre defined value), Gate-Way-Node blacklist that
malicious node. The proposed algorithm detects both packet
flood (in packet flood attacks, malicious nodes forwards large
numbers of different packets) and replica flood (in replica
flood attacks, malicious nodes send replica that is copy of the
packets to various innocent nodes) attack deterministically.
Researchers also proposed probabilistic detection for replica
flood attack, which improved the detection time. The pro-
posed algorithm is difficult to deploy (Every packet pass to
the centralized node) in DTNs. This algorithm always needs a
connected environment like TCP/IP based, which is downside
of the algorithm.
The work in [36] proposed distributed algorithm to miti-
gate malicious nodes. A rate limiting algorithm is proposed
to tackle misbehaving nodes. In the proposed algorithm,
during initial set up of the network, every node forward
request packet to trusted authority (TA) for rate limit cer-
tificate (RLC). TA give RLC to every node according to the
requirements. Nodes forwards RLC along with packets and
packet claims (every node count has own packets and make a
claim of forwarded packets). Destination nodes cross check
the packet claims. The proposed algorithm detects malicious
nodes according to pigeon-hole principal. Proposed algo-
rithm is very efficient to detect and mitigate flood attacks.
Nonetheless, detection time is very high which can not save
precious resources until detection and also it waste more
resources (because every node forwards packet claims along
with original packet, which consumed buffer space, this ulti-
mately cause low PDR and high PLR), which is downside of
the proposed algorithm. The work in the research article [42]
improved the work [36]. The proposed algorithm adds learn-
ing automata algorithm to modify the existing algorithm.
The proposed algorithm approximately count the packets
(according to the researchers), which enhanced the existing
algorithm [36].
The work in [17] proposed the algorithm which detects
and mitigate flood attacks. The proposed algorithm used
cookies (for mitigation of malicious nodes), which is made
of time stamp, source id, and a random number. Further,
the researchers add HMAC and XOR with cookies for more
randomness (Researchers Strengthen the proposed algorithm
to use HMAC and XOR for cookies creation, which tight the
security of packets). Algorithm detects malicious nodes by
cookies verification. Proposed algorithm detects only out side
(nodes without cryptographic credential) malicious nodes,
which is a downside of the algorithm (The proposed algo-
rithm do not have the ability to detect insider malicious nodes
which have a valid cryptographic key and other credential).
The article [43] proposed reputation based algorithm to tackle
misbehavior nodes. The malicious nodes have the ability to
flood networks with bogus messages but does not create gen-
uine messages (according to the assumption of researchers).
During initial set up, nodes create a genuine message and for-
ward to TA. TA give reputation to nodes. However, TA does
not give reputation to nodes which does not have the ability to
create genuine messages (Malicious nodes). Receiver nodes
check the reputation of the nodes, if reputation is less than
predefined threshold, receiver does not accept messages from
nodes. Authors proposed an ideal preventive algorithm to
stop malicious nodes. However, this article does not give an
answer to some questions. Why malicious nodes do not have
the ability to create legitimate packets?. How TA recognized
legitimate and bogus packets?. What are the criterion’s for
legitimate packets?.
The article [38] piggyback the existing encounter record
scheme with rate limit to detect and mitigate malicious nodes.
Malicious nodes have two choices, either change times-
tamp or sequence number. But by doing these alteration
encounter record becomes inconsistent. Proposed algorithm
detect those malicious nodes which alter encounter record.
High detection time and cost (Nodes share encounter his-
tory, which consumed buffer and bandwidth which ultimately
cause low PDR and high PLR) are the downside of the
proposed algorithm. Researchers in [39] proposed a central-
ized Stream-Node to detect malicious nodes. Stream-Node
have three table that is B-list (Blacklist table), DPT-Table
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(Delivery probability table) and rate limit table. In the
proposed algorithm Stream-Node calculate actual delivery
probability from rate limit table. Then compare it with the
estimated probability from DPT-Table. If there is any incon-
sistency Stream-Node detect malicious nodes. In the pro-
posed algorithm stream-nodemove like patrolling police with
every packet. This is costly and difficult to deploy in DTNs.
This article proposed novel algorithms to detect and
mitigate malicious nodes [44], that launches flood attacks.
The proposed algorithms not only enhance detection rate,
and detection time but also reduces resources consumption
that ultimately improved PDR and PLR. More specifically,
the contributions of this articles are:
• Revamp To lie Or Comply (RTOC): The proposed
RTOC algorithm 1 is the enhanced version of the
To lie or Comply algorithm [36]. The RTOC thwarts
flood attacks by using huffman coding compression
without packet claims. Algorithm [36] forwards packet
claims along with every packets, which consumed pre-
cious resources until detection. Unlike [36] our RTOC
forwards compress packets and do not decompress
packets until claims verification, which save precious
resources (Buffer) and enhanced PDR and PLR.
• Inter site Flood Attack Mitigation (IFAM): The pro-
posed IFAM algorithm 2 mitigates flood attacks using
agent-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The
IFAM counts the number of messages of every node to
rule out the malicious node in the inter site scenario/use
case.
• Holistic Flood Attack Mitigation (HFAM): The pro-
posed HFAM algorithm 3 further enhance IFAM 2,
and detects malicious nodes in the generic scenario.
In HFAM, every node deployed IDS that create a key,
which is appended with every packet. HFAM makes
Message Authentication Code (MAC. Hash with Key)
of every packet and then forwards packets to destination
nodes. Destination nodes verify MAC.
Th rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section II
discusses the Preliminaries/critical analysis of flood attacks.
Section III Section IV and Section V are related to pro-
posed algorithms, RTOC (A), IFAM (A2), and HFAM (A3)
respectively. SectionVI is related to comparison, Followed by
conclusion, recommendations and future work in SectionVII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section analyses existing flood mitigation algorithms
with various parameters rigorously, which enable this article
to modify one existing algorithm of flood mitigation [36].
Few researchers proposed flood mitigation schemes which
send extra information (Packet Claims) along with packets.
Few articles proposed flood mitigation algorithms which
share encounter history with other nodes. This consumed
buffer, creates PDR, PLR and resources consumption prob-
lems (already mentioned in this article). Few researchers
proposed algorithms which do not detect malicious nodes
TABLE 1. Symbol list.
until all nodes in networks share encounter history or packet
claim verification. These algorithms detect malicious nodes,
however consumed too much time and dis improve detection
accuracy (because nodes are disconnected in DTNs). Based
on these few observations, this article analyzed existing flood
mitigation algorithms, which is discussed in this section. All
constants used in this section are based on observations and
analysis, the exact value of constant term used in analysis and
its exact relationship with parameters are out of the scope
of this article. Table 1 is symbol list, which summarized
parameter symbols which are used in this section.
A. EXTRA INFORMATION ALONG WITH PACKETS
According to the observation of this article, most of the
mitigation algorithms forward some extra information along
with packets. That is rate limit based algorithms which for-
wards packet claims along with packets. Encounter-based
algorithms used history information in mitigation. Due to
the increased size of extra information included in packet,
this ultimately causes PDR and PLR problems. According to
analysis ‘‘PDR’’ and ‘‘PLR’’ both depend on Buffer size (θ )
and BC, more details can be found in [23], [45].
PDR/PLR = C1 ∗ θ (1)
Eq. (1) implies that PDR is increased and PLR is decreased
with buffer size. Where C1 is connectivity constants which
depends on connectivity, encounter, and packet processing
capability. It implies if there is no connectivity, encounter
opportunity and processing capability (node processor is busy
in something else). In this case, Eq. (1) will not be applicable.
Eq. (1) implies PDR is increased with certain limit. However,
according to Eq. (2), PDR is decreased and PLR is increased
with BC.
PLR/PDR = C2 ∗ BC (2)
According to analysis, BC depends on packet size ‘‘ρ’’ [46]
and number of packets ‘‘γ ’’. If packet size is large or mali-
cious nodes forwards large number of packets, it will con-
sume buffer, so ultimately decreases PDR and increases PLR.
Eq. 3 shows this relation.
ρ ∗ γ /C3 = BC (3)
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Put the value of Eq. 3 into Eq. 2 we get new relation between
packet size, number of packets with PDR and PLR.
PLR/PDR = (C2) ∗ (ρ ∗ γ /C3) (4)





(ρ ∗ γ ) (5)
Energy is required for nodes to forwards and process
packets. There are three different types of energy which
are required for nodes to communicate, that is Scan Energy
(SE) (there are two types of SE, Scan Request Energy and
Scan Response Energy, this article take an equal amount of
SE for both Scan Request and Scan Response), Transmit
Energy (TrE) and Processing Energy (PE).
1) SCAN ENERGY (SE)
A type of energy which is required for scanning (searching)
a new nodes/channel for the encounter.
2) TRANSMIT ENERGY (TRE)
A type of energy which is required for transmit of packet to
the destination.
3) PROCESSING ENERGY (PE)
A type of energy required to process received packets. Total
energy spend in the communication process is the sum of SE,
TrE and PE.
Total Energy (TotalE) = (SE + TrE + PE) (6)
Total energy required to send packets is equal to the sum of
TrE and SE (Sender Side). Total energy consumed to receive
packets are equal to the sum of SE and PE (Receiver Side).
According to the analysis EC depends on ‘‘ρ’’ [46]. ‘‘ρ’’
is directly proportional to EC and BWC. If the size of the
packets are large so it will consume more bandwidth and
buffer, which ultimately cause PDR and PLR problems. If the
size of packets is large so more TrE and PE are required to
transmit and receive packets.
ρ = C4 ∗ (EC) (7)
ρ = C5 ∗ BWC (8)
Eq. 3, 7 and 8 implies that due to packet size, buffer,
bandwidth, and EC are increased. According to observation
PDR and PLR depend on EC. If nodes consumedmore energy
so nodes quickly become down, which create PDR and PLR
problems. PDR and PLR also depends on Scan Interval (SI)
(The time between two consecutive Scan is called Scan Inter-
val). SI is inversely proportional to EC (if nodes frequently
scan nodes it will consume more energy) (The prove of
above all equations and statements will be given in simulation
section of this article, due to pages limitation). apart from the
above some analysis PDR also depends on the transmission
range and the transmission speed of nodes. PDR is directly
proportional to transmission range (TR) and node walking
speed/nodes transmission speed (NWS)
PDR = C6 ∗ Transmission Range (TR) (9)
PDR = C7 ∗ (NWS) (10)
where C6 and C7 are constants which depends on Number-
of-encounters. The Number-of-encounters is increased with
TR and NWS, which increased PDR and decreased PLR, for
more detail this article refer article [23].
B. SHARING OF PACKET CLAIMS AND ENCOUNTER
HISTORY
Detection accuracy of algorithms is a very important param-
eter to analyzed algorithms. Some of the proposed algo-
rithms are not very accurate to mitigate flood attacks in
DTNs. The false positive and false negative ratios are high,
because those algorithms, share encounter history and claims
to detect attacks. However, it took a very long time to
detects attacks, due to intermittent connectivity of nodes in
DTNs. Consider rate-limit-based and encounter-based algo-
rithms. Both types of algorithms detect malicious nodes only
when other nodes encounter, because rate-limit-based algo-
rithms used cross checking strategy and encounter-based-
algorithms share encounter history information with other
nodes (already mentioned in this article). According to the
observations of this article, detection accuracy depends on
contact-time/contact-opportunity. That is, if nodes encounter
frequently that is less contact-time, so detection accuracy
will be high otherwise low. If detection accuracy is (ν) and
contact time is (τ ), then detection accuracy will be calculated
as follow.
ν = C8/τ (11)
Also if the number of malicious nodes (λ) are high so the
probability of detection are high [36]. Which decreased false
positive and false negative ratios.
ν = C9 ∗ λ (12)
But ‘‘ν’’ also depends on contact duration (κ)
ν = C10 ∗ κ (13)
If nodes meet frequently but κ is less, so definitely it will
affect the value of ν (if nodes encounter but duration of
encounter is less so there is the probability that nodes do
not share an encounter history packets and packets claims or
probability of aborted packets will be high). Above observa-
tions and analysis implies that ‘‘ν’’ is related to area (5). ‘‘ν’’






where ‘‘a’’ and ‘‘b’’ is the lower and upper limit receptively.
C11 is constant which depends on mobility pattern/model,
nodes walking speed, transmit range, buffer capacity. ‘‘n’’ is
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a real number, the value of ‘‘n’’ varies from case to case (The
value of n depends on the scenario, walking speed and the
number of nodes in the scenario). Eq. 14 implies that if nodes
deployed in the small area, which will enhance the ratio of ν.
Mobility constant C11 is directly related to ν if nodes move
in the opposite direction (towards each others) and inversely
related if nodes moves in same direction.
C. RESOURCES CONSUMPTION IN VARIOUS FLOOD
ATTACKS
As mentioned earlier in this article that malicious nodes
launch flood attacks, which consumed scarce resources,
which cause PDR and PLR problems. This section analyzed
various flood attack scenarios/use cases.
1) FLOOD ATTACKS SCENARIOS
There are so many types of flood attacks. This article takes
three different types of flood attacks for analytic analysis,
which are followed as.
a: ATTACK 1
Consider an attack scenario of multiple malicious nodes,
which target one benign node to launches flood attack.
b: ATTACK 2
Consider the second attack scenario of multiple attacker
nodes, which target multiple legitimate nodes.
c: ATTACK 3
Consider the third scenario of malicious nodes in which one
malicious, target multiples innocent nodes.
2) ANALYSIS OF FLOOD ATTACKS
This section analyzed flood attacks. However, before more
discussion on flood attacks, this article discussed a mathe-
matical model for analysis.
a: MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR ANALYSIS
Let BC be a buffer consumption and BWC be a bandwidth
consumption and Number of Packets is (ϒ).
BC = C12 ∗ ϒ (15)
BWC = C13 ∗ ϒ (16)
Under some constant value. But the other hand ‘‘ϒ’’ is
directly related to Number Of Nodes (ω)
ω = C14 ∗ ϒ (17)
However, when BC becomes high, so nodes availability
becomes low (Nodes do not have the ability to process other
packets / accommodate any more packets, so victim nodes
becomes unavailable for other nodes), also BC are directly
related to PLR.
BC = C15/Availability(η) (18)
BC = C16/PDR (19)
BC = C17 ∗ PLR (20)
TABLE 2. Analysis of flood attacks.
Based on these analysis/observation Table 2 is created. This
summarized BC, BWC, Availability, PDR, and PLR in vari-
ous flood attacks scenarios.
Corollary FromAnalysis: From the above analysis this arti-
cle concluded that PDR and PLR depends on buffer, if nodes
waste less amount of buffer, so drops ratios becomes less
and PDR will be high. This article concluded that resources
consumption depends on packet size and number of packets.
If number of packets and packets size are reduced, so it
will improved the ratios of PDR and PLR (Based on these
observation this article proposed RTOC, which consumed
less buffer due to compress packets and increased detection
accuracy due to contact time with encounter nodes). Further-
more, detection accuracy of rate limit based and encounter
based algorithms depends on contact time and contact dura-
tion, if researchers enhanced contact time, contact duration,
so according to analysis of this article, it will improved
detection accuracy. This article recommends, if researchers
used new methods other than claims exchange and sharing
encounter history, so it will improved detection accuracy and
detection time significantly.
D. EVALUATION PARAMETERS
Simulation is evaluated on the basis of parameters discussed
below.
1) PDR
It is the ratio between delivered packets and total created
packets. If number of delivered packets are NDP and total
created packets are TCP then PDR will be calculated as
follow.
PDR = (NDP/TCP) ∗ 100 (21)
2) PLR
It is the total drops packets in the simulation. If a total created
packet (TCP), total delivered packet (TDP) then PLR will be
calculated with a following formula.
PLR = ((TCP− TDP)/TCP) ∗ 100 (22)
3) OVERHEAD RATIO (OH)
If total relay packet (TRP) then OH will be calculated as
follow.
OH = ((TRP - TDP)/TDP) ∗ 100 (23)
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4) LATENCY
It is the amount of time required from the creation of packets
to delivery to destination.
5) AVERAGE BUFFER TIME (ABT)
ABT is the amount of time that messages spend in the buffer.
ABT have significant impact on PDR and PLR that why
this article considered ABT is very important parameters to
judge the efficiency of flood mitigation algorithms (Accord-
ing to our knowledge this one is first article which considered
ABT).
6) TOTAL ENCOUNTER (TE)
TE is the total number of the encounters (Contacts) of every
node in the simulation (No one calculated TE in proposed
mitigation scheme of flood attacks). The ratios of PDR and
PLR depends on TE, that is why this article calculates TE in
various flood attack scenarios.
7) NUMBER OF ATTACK PACKETS
As mentioned earlier in this article that malicious nodes
forwards a large number of packets to overwhelm benign
nodes. This article calculated the number of attacks packets
of malicious nodes with various strategies (tests, discussed in
simulation section).
8) DETECTION RATE/DETECTION ACCURACY
The proportion of attack packets that are detected out of all
packets (Malicious nodes forward large number of packets,
all packets are not malicious packets. If malicious nodes
forward packet above threshold/limit which is actually attack
packets. This article detects/calculated malicious packets
with various test discussed in simulation section) are called
detection rate.
9) DETECTION DELAY
The average time required to detect first malicious
packet/malicious node is called detection delay. Detection
delay is very important parameter to judge detection algo-
rithms, because few proposed algorithms detects malicious
nodes with high time which obviously wastes precious
resources until detection. That is why this article calculated
detection delay of proposed algorithms.
10) BC
It is total buffer consumed in simulation. If the total buffer is
TB, Free buffer is FB and used buffer is UB then UB will be
calculated as follow.
UB = (TB - FB) (24)
BC is the most important parameter (because DTNs have
scarce resources and the main goal of malicious nodes are to
target the buffer of innocent nodes, which ultimately causes
PDR and PLR problems). According to our knowledge every
researchers in this area claims that due flood attack buffer are
consumed, however no one calculates how much buffer are
consumed with real simulation results. This article calculated
BC of our detection algorithms by various strategies (tests).
11) TWT/BWC
It is the average amount of bandwidth consumed in the sim-
ulation. When source node forwards packets to destination
nodes obviously it waste bandwidth, which is very important
to calculates. This is because malicious nodes forwards large
number of packets as compared to benign nodes that is why
it waste a lot of bandwidth. According to our knowledge,
researchers did not calculated wasted bandwidth in flood mit-
igation algorithms, however this article calculated bandwidth
consumption of nodes in flood attack with various tests. If
total relayed packets are TRP, total aborted packets TAP, total
sender aborted packets TSAP, total receiver aborted packets
is TRAP and size of packets in Kb is (SPK) then TWB will
be,
TWT = ((TRP) + (TAP)) * (SPK))/1000 (25)
1000 in the above formula convert Kb to M directly. In the
above formula, TAP are those packets which are relayed but
immediately aborted. TAP waste bandwidth but these packets
are not included in drops. Actually, there are two categories of
aborted packets, that is sender aborted and receiver aborted.
TAP in above formula are actually sender aborted. If TAP are
receiver aborted then Eq. 25 will becomes
TWT = ((TRP) + ((TSAP) − TRAP) * (SPK))/1000)
(26)
III. REVAMP TO LIE OR COMPLY (RTOC)-A1
This article proposed enhanced version (compression based)
of existing rate limit [36] based algorithm to thwart PDR and
PLR.
In RTOC initially every node send a request message to
TA for RLC. TA give sign RLC according to nodes require-
ments (changes with time). Every node itself counts its own
packets like [36]. Nodes create P-Claim (Packet count claim
that is how many packets is forwarded), and T-Claim (Trans-
mission count, How many replicas of the same packet are
forwarded, Process hop-by-hop), for more detail refer [36].
Nodes append P-Claim and T-Claimwith packets. Every node
compress packets without P-Claim and T-Claim with Huff-
man coding. This article chooses loss-less Huffman coding
for compression. Then node forwards packets to destination
nodes. Destination nodes cross-check P-Claim and T-Claim.
If claim verify, node assume the packet (Node) is legitimate,
then decompress the packet. If any inconsistency found in
packets claim, nodes assume the packet is coming from mali-
cious nodes. Nodes report the signer of that packet to TA.
TA create a signed message and forwards to all nodes in
the networks about malicious nodes. The proposed algorithm
detects and mitigates all those malicious nodes which alter
P-claim and T-claim.
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Algorithm 1 RTOC-A1Input: Malicious Packet
Output: Detection of Malicious Packets
0 : PhaseOne :
1 : Every node share Public key with TA and with other
nodes.
2 : Every node send RP to TA for RLC
3 : TA Grant RLC to every nodes according to request
requirement for specific time/Change with a time
PhaseTwo :
4 : if have a message to forward then
5 : Generate P-Claim for New Packets and T-Claim
for Every Packets, Compress Packets Without
P-Claim and T-Claim, Append P-Claim, T-Claim
with Compress Packet and Forward Packets else
Go to Step 4
X : End of If
PhaseThree :
6 : if Receiver Receive message then
if Verify Sign, P-Claim, T-Claim then
Go to Step 10
else
Go to Step 7
X : End If
7 : Attack Detected
8 : Report to TA
9 : TA create sign packet and Forward to all node
about malicious node
10 : No Attack Detected
11 : Decompress Packets
X : End of if
12 : End of Algorithm
This article simulates the proposed algorithms an oppor-
tunistic network environment (ONE) [47] simulator (ONE
is java based simulator which is specifically design for
DTNs).Proposed algorithm significantly enhanced PDR and
PLR relative to [36]. This is just because of the fact of
compression, which consumed little buffer, bandwidth, and
energy relative to [36] (Prove of this will be given in the
simulation section, how much buffer, bandwidth and energy
are consumed in both [36] in our proposed algorithms).
Detection accuracy is a little bit enhanced with our RTOC,
due to less consumption of resources. The algorithm [36]
exchange packet claims along with all packets (which is
not compressed), which consumed more buffer. Some time
nodes exchange claims which are dropped, due to buffer
overloading, which implies that detection accuracy will be
low. Unlike algorithm [36] our RTOC forwards compress
packets. If claim verify then our RTOC decompress packet,
which consumed less buffer of every node. That is why claim
verification packets are not dropped due to buffer scarcity,
which enhanced detection accuracy and detection time.
A. SIMULATION SET-UP
This article has analyzed the performance of RTOC for
misbehavior nodes in DTNs, through various evaluation
TABLE 3. Simulation parameters list for RTOC.
techniques. Evaluation is completed with the help of simu-
lation. The proposed RTOC is compared with state-of-the-
art algorithms. Simulation is carried out on the parameters




In experiment 1 this article calculated PDR, AL, and OH by
two tests, that is Test 1 (When Nodes have a 5M buffer) and
Test 2 (WhenNodes have a 2M buffer). Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b)
shows PDR with various routing protocols (This article only
shows the results of the epidemic, direct delivery and DD1,
other protocols show similar results). PDR is approximately
80 to 97 percent (in Test1) and 61 to 80 (in Test2) percent
of all routing protocols, when there are no malicious nodes.
When five percent of malicious nodes are deployed PDR
is suddenly decreased and the graph becomes below fifty
percent (this article only shows PDR due to page limitation.
PLR = 100-PLR). Simulation result shows our proposed
RTOC enhanced PDR and PLR, due to less BC. Simulation
results show that there is an almost negligible effect on PDR
and PLR, with Direct Delivery. Because, Direct Delivery only
transfers message to the destination directly, which do not
consume too much buffer. If buffer is not consumed so there
is an almost negligible effect. First Contact also shows almost
the same results.
This article enhanced the capability of malicious nodes
in direct delivery to forwards more messages as compared
to ordinary malicious nodes. This article called this Direct
Delivery With Enhance Flood Capability (DD1). This arti-
cle set the ratios of messages creation of normal, ordinary
malicious and extraordinary malicious nodes are 25, 5 and
1 seconds respectively. In case of this extraordinary capability
of malicious nodes, buffer are a little bit more consumed
than Direct Delivery. Which decreased PDR and increased
PLR. Simulation result shows in Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b) our
RTOC performs better in term of PDR and PLR. A1 shows
approximately 4 to 6 percent (Test1) and 4 to 18 (Test2)
enhancement in PDR and PLR.
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Fig. 1(d) and Fig. 1(c) shows the simulation results of
AL of various routing protocols. Simulation results show
that AL of RTOC is dis-improves. This is because of the
extra processing of huff-man coding in sender side, malicious
nodes detection and decompression of packets in the receiver
side. The packets spend more time in the buffer that is why
AL becomes high. Fig. 1(e) shows simulation results of OH of
the epidemic router in both test1 and test2. Simulation results
clearly show that OH is improved of A1 because malicious
nodes are mitigated (if malicious nodes are detected then OH
on link reduced automatically).
Corollary From Experiment 1: Simulation results of vari-
ous nodes scenarios show different results because scenarios
are totally different (In 10 percent malicious nodes scenario,
10 malicious nodes and 90 innocent, in 20 percent malicious
scenario there are 20 malicious and 80 innocent etc). From
simulation this article concluded that PDR is directly related
to buffer size (PDR of 5M is higher than 2M buffer).
2) EXPERIMENT 2
In experiment 2 this article calculated BC with various strate-
gies that is with different malicious nodes scenario (Test1),
with various simulation time (Test2) and with various mali-
cious nodes message creation interval (Test3)
Most of the researchers analyzed that due to flood attacks
resources (Buffer, bandwidth, and energy) are consumed.
However, according to our knowledge, no one shows how
much are consumed with simulation results in flood attacks.
This article calculated BC of all nodes, however, there are
hundred nodes in our scenario in A1. That is why for illus-
tration this article select randomly five nodes in 5, 10, 20 and
40 percent malicious nodes scenario. Fig. 1(f) shows simula-
tion results of BC of various malicious nodes scenarios.
Fig. 1(g) shows BC of 5 percent malicious nodes sce-
nario with various time in the simulation. This article also
calculates, BC of 5 percent malicious scenario with various
messages creation interval of malicious nodes (after constant
simulation time 2000 seconds). This article takes message
creation interval of benign nodes 20-30 seconds constant
and message creation interval of malicious nodes 1-5, 1-10,
1-15 and 1-20 seconds. For illustration purpose, this article
only shows the result of 5 (due to page limitation chose
5 nodes, all nodes show similar results) different nodes which
are randomly selected after simulation. Fig.1(h) shows the
simulation results of malicious nodes with various message
creation interval. For illustration purpose, this article shows
BC of epidemic router other routing protocols also shows the
same type results.
Corollary From Experiment 2: Simulation results show
that in each use case RTOC consumed less buffer, that is
why PDR and PLR are improved. This article already proved
in the analysis section that BC is inversely proportional to
PDR. This article also observed from simulation results that
BC is increased with simulation time. Simulation results
also show that BC is inversely related to message creation
interval.
3) EXPERIMENT 3
In experiment 3 this article calculated PDR, PLR, AL, ABT
and OH. This article calculated PDR, PLR with various mali-
cious nodes scenarios (Test1), with various mobility model
(Test2) and with various Scan Interval (SI) (Test3) of mali-
cious nodes. This article also calculates AL, ABT and OH
with nodes SI (Test4), nodes Scan Energy (SE) (Test5) and
mobility model (Test6). Most of the researchers claim that
due to flood attacks, energy is consumed, however according
to our knowledge no one calculated in flood attacks (which is
already mentioned in this article). When malicious nodes for-
ward packets in flood attacks it wastes the energy resources
of benign nodes, the benign nodes becomes down which
create various problems including PDR and PLR. This article
simulates various flood attacks scenarios without and with
our A1 to give some specific energy to each node. Due to
flood attacks, nodes consumed more energy so ultimately
cause PDR and PLR problems. Simulation results show that
our proposed A1 consumed less energy, which enhanced
OH, ABT which further enhanced PDR and PLR. AL is
dis-improved due to compression in sender side, detection,
and decompression of packets in the receiver side.
This article set different simulation parameters to calculate
EC. The parameters are followed as, initial energy 500, Ener-
gyAwareRouter (EAR) is routing protocol and various SE
and SI mentioned on top or in the bottom of each simulation
graphs. Fig. 1(i) shows our A1 improved PDR significantly
with various malicious scenarios. Because A1 consumed less
energy so it improved nodes lifetime. Fig. 1(j) shows that our
algorithm enhanced PDR in various mobility model. Fig. 1(k)
shows our proposed A1 performs well to improved PDR in
various SI of nodes, due to less EC. Fig. 1(l) shows the simu-
lation results of AL andABTwith SI. Simulation results show
that A1 improved ABT, which further enhanced PDR. AL is
dis-improved with A1. Fig. 2(a) shows the simulation results
of AL, ABT and OH. Simulation results show A1 improved
ABT and OH. Fig. 2(b) shows a simulation of ABT with var-
ious mobility model. Simulation results proved that proposed
A1 performs well to enhanced ABT with various mobility
model.
Corollary From Experiment 3: This article simulates PDR,
PLR, ABT and AL with different SE and SI (actually by
giving some specific energy this article checked node life
time because when nodes consume more energy so it will
quickly becomes down which affect the ratios of PDR and
PLR). From simulation results, this article concluded that our
RTOC prevent a malicious node that is why it consumes less
energy so it improved PDR and PLR. From simulation results
this article concluded that PDR of CMM are greater than
all model (because nodes moves in very small area cluster,
it forwards more packets that is number of encounters are
higher than all model due to small area) and PDR of RWM is
less than all model (In RWM nodes moves randomly in large
area). PDR is directly related to a number of encounters. This
article also observed from simulation results that PDR are
directly related to SI because if SI is high so nodes consumes
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less energy so ultimately enhanced PDR, PLR and ABT. This
article also observed if SE is increase so it will increase the
value of ABT. This article also observed from simulation
results that ABT of RWP is higher than other movement
model because nodes walk randomly in a large area, so the
probability of BC is less (forwards fewer packets). Actually,
in RWP packets spend more time unlike CMM. In CMM
nodes walk in the small cluster so it will forwards more
packets to other nodes, which consumed the buffer of that
particular node. That is why PLR becomes high in CMM so
ultimately it will decrease ABT.
4) EXPERIMENT 4
In experiment 4 this article simulate TWT/BWC with a
various Test. This article calculated TWT with SI (Test1),
nodes SE (Test2) and with various routing protocol (Test3).
Fig. 2(c) shows the simulation results of TWT with nodes
SI. Simulation results show A1 consumed minimum band-
width in flood attacks. Fig. 2(d) shows the simulation results
of TWT with various SE. Simulation results clearly show
that BWC of A1 is minimum. Fig. 2(e) shows the simu-
lation results of TWT with various routing protocols. Sim-
ulation results show that A1 enhanced TWT with routing
protocols.
Corollary From Experiment 4: This article observed from
simulation results that TWT are directly proportional to SI
and inversely related to SE. Because if SI is high so nodes
consumed minimum energy and forwards more packets,
so ultimately it will increase TWT. If SE is high so nodes con-
sumed more energy it will decrease nodes lifetime (transmit
fewer packets, and scan less packets), so ultimately decreased
FIGURE 3. Flood attack in two sites/city scenario.
BWC. Simulation results show that epidemic consumedmore
bandwidth and direct delivery consumed less bandwidth.
IV. INTER-SITE FLOOD ATTACK MITIGATION (IFAM)-A2
Consider an attack scenario of malicious nodes in Fig. 3
which launches flood attacks. There are two sites of DTNs
which are connected by a link.
There are nodes in the middle of the connecting link, which
forwards packets between two sites. For illustration this arti-
cle deployed two nodes, M1 and M2 in the figure, however
in reality, there are more than two nodes. The resources of
M1 and M2 are very important relative to others. Because
the whole network depends on M1 and M2. If M1 and
M2 down due to flood attacks, it means the whole network
becomes down.Malicious nodes launch flood attacks to target
M1 and M2 to overused limited resources of M1 and M2.
This article proposed A2 which save resources of M1 and
M2 which enhanced PDR and PLR. Before more discussion
on the working of A2, this article makes some assumptions
which are follow as. During initial set up, IDS are deployed
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FIGURE 4. Packet format.
in forwarder nodes (M1, M2 etc in this case). Every IDS
generates key, Only TA knows that key (TA also have that
algorithm which generate that key).
Packet Format: Every node send packets with a specific
format. Fig. 4 is a packet format. Every node adds source id,
destination id, payload, and RLC/RUC. Every node encrypts
only payload part with the private key. When ‘‘A’’ forwards
a packet to ‘‘B’’, ‘‘B’’ forwards a packet to ‘‘C’’, so in this
case ‘‘A’’ sign a packet then ‘‘B’’ also sign a signed packet
(‘‘A’’ already sign this packet).
Network Set Up Phase:During network set up phase, every
node except IDS base nodes send a Request-Packet (RP) to
TA for RLC. TA grant sign RLC to every node except IDS
based nodes. IDS based nodes generate key and append with
RP then forwards RP to TA. TA verify ids key, then grant sign
Rate-Unlimited-Certificate (RUC) to IDS based nodes. RUC
is an unlimited certificate, which means IDS based nodes
have permission to forwards unlimited packets.
Forwarding Phase: In the forwarding phase, every node
encrypts only the payload portion with the private key. Every
node forwards a packet along with RLC except IDS based
nodes, which forwards packets with RUC. IDS based nodes
have a database. When nodes forward packets to IDS based
nodes, IDS based nodes verify RLC, sender node sign. If both
verify then IDS based nodes counts packets, save counts value
in front of nodes public key in the database and decrease
RLC by 1. Then forwards packets of forwarder nodes to the
required destination. If node ‘‘A’’ forwards a packet to ‘‘B’’
and ‘‘B’’ forwards a packet to M1. Both nodes sign a packet,
M1 decreased the count of original sources which is ‘‘A’’ in
this case (fair system). If any inconsistency found in both
RLC and the private key of nodes, IDS based nodes report
that node to TA. TA create a signed message forwards to all
nodes in networks to blacklist malicious nodes.
A. CRYPTANALYSIS OF A2
Consider an attacks scenario on A2. If malicious nodes for-
ward five packets to one IDS based node and five to other
IDS based node and packet limit are five packets, this type
of attacks is detected. Because after some specific time IDS
based nodes share forwarding history to each other. If one
node forwards packets more than limit with the help of
more than one IDS based nodes, so after history sharing
that particular malicious nodes is detected because of time-
stamp. If malicious nodes changed time-stamp, this type of
attack is also detected because IDS based nodes add owns
(when received packets add receiving time) time-stamp, com-
pare packets with its receiving time. The proposed algorithm
exactly detects the malicious nodes and blacklist malicious
nodes which launches a flood attack. The proposed A2 also
have the ability to detect colluding attacks.
Algorithm 2 IFAM-A2 Input: Malicious Packet
Output: Detection/Prevention of Malicious Packets
0 : PhaseOne :
1 : Every node share Public key with TA
2 : Ordinary node send RP to TA for RLC
3 : TA Grant RLC to every node except IDS based nodes
4 : IDS base node append key with RP and forward to
TA for RUC
5 : TA generate same key like IDS based nodes
6 : if verify then
7 : Grant RUC
8 : else
9 : Goto step 23
X : End If
PhaseTwo :
10 : if have a message to forward then
11 : Sign packet and append RLC/RUC then forward
12 : else
13 : GO to Step 10
X : End If
PhaseThree :
14 : if Receiving node is IDS base nodes then
15 : Verify RLC and Sender private key
16 : if both Verify then
17 : Save count in Database (Number of packets,
time stamp, node ID), Decrease RLC by 1 and
forward packet Go to Step 25
18 : else
19 : Goto step 23
X : End If
20 : else
21 : Sign packet with Private key (because node
is not IDS, it is ordinary node)
22 : Go to Step 10
X : End If
23 : Report To TA
24 : TA create sign packet forward to all node, and black
list malicious nodes. Go to 28
25 : Node is legitimate, forward its packets.
26 : if If time is specific (defined time) then
27 : IDs nodes share history with other IDS nodes
X : End If
28 : End of Algorithm
B. SIMULATION SET UP
This article simulates A2 with slightly different parameters
used in A1. This article takes total 25 nodes with 5 malicious
and 20 legitimate nodes for A2 in three different groups with
3 M buffer size, 25 wait time interval and with RandomWay-
Point mobility model in ONE Simulator. Site 1 contains
10 nodes, site 2 contain 10 nodes and 5 nodes in the middle
which transfer messages between two sites.
C. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section results gained of A2 are discussed.
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1) EXPERIMENT 5
In experiment 5 this article calculated PDR, PLR, and BC of
various nodes with various tests. This article calculated PDR,
PLR with routing protocol (Test1) and BC of middle nodes
with the epidemic router (Test2). Fig. 5(a) shows simulation
results of PDR and PLR. In the horizontal side of the graph,
nodes are shown with various routing protocols. Simulation
is carried out on Epidemic without our scheme (EM), Epi-
demic with our secure scheme (EO), FirstContact without
our scheme (FM), FirstContact with our secure scheme (FO),
DirectDelivery without our scheme (DM), DirectDelivery
with our secure scheme (DO), SprayAndWait without our
scheme (SM), SprayAndWait with our secure scheme (SO).
Simulation results show our proposed A2 enhanced PDR and
PLR significantly in flood attacks.
Fig. 5(b) shows the simulation results of BC. Simulation
results generated after 1000 seconds. For illustration, this
article shows BC of the epidemic router, all others routing
protocols shows similar results. Horizontal side of the graph
shows the middle (forwarder nodes) and average BC. Simu-
lation results show that our secure A2 saves buffer of middle
nodes, that is why PDR and PLR are improved.
Corollary From Experiment 5: Actually malicious nodes
target middle nodes. This article observed PDR of SprayAnd-
Wait is high relative to other protocols, due to less BC
(SprayAndWait, wait sometime after spray phase).
2) EXPERIMENT 6
This article calculated TE, TWT, and the number-of-attack
packets with SE (Test1) and SI (Test2). This article also cal-
culated TWT with various routing protocols (Test3). Experi-
ment is done on EAR, with transmitting energy 0.1, SE and SI
mentioned at the top of each graph. Fig. 5(c) shows simulation
results of TE, TWT, and number-of-attacks packets with
various SE. Fig. 5(d) shows simulation results of TE, TWT,
and number-of-attacks packets with various SI. Simulation
results of both test1 and test2 show that TWT is improved
with our A2 (because A2 prevent malicious nodes). Sim-
ulation results also show that a number-of-encounters are
less in A2 which implies our A2 prevent malicious nodes
packets. Fig. 5(e) shows the simulation results of TWT with
various routing protocols. Simulation results show that the
epidemic consumed more bandwidth relative to other pro-
tocols. BWC of Direct Delivery is less relative to all other
protocols. Simulation results show that in flood attacks our
proposed A2 performs well to consumed less BWC with all
protocols.
Corollary From Experiment 6: From simulation results this
article observed number-of-encounters are directly related
to SI and inversely to SE. Because when SI is high, nodes
consumed less energy which enhanced nodes lifetime so
number-of-encounters are increased. When SE is high so
nodes becomes quickly down, that is why the number-
of-encounters decreased, which ultimately decreased PDR.
Simulation results also show TWT is directly related to
number-of-encounters.
3) EXPERIMENT 7
This article calculated PDR with various mobility model
(Test1) and PDR with various SE (Test2). This article
also calculated PDR, TE, and number-of-attack-packets
with various simulation time (Test3), with nodes walk-
ing speed (Test4) and nodes deployments in simulation
(Test5).
Fig. 5(f) shows simulation results of both A1 and A2 with
various SE. Simulation results show A2 improved PDR.
Fig. 5(g) and Fig. 5(h) shows simulation results of PDR,
TE and number-of-attack-packets with simulation time and
nodes walking speed respectively. Simulation results shows
proposed A2 enhanced PDR. Also, TE is less in A2 which
proved that our A2 prevent malicious packets. Simulation
result also shows a number-of-attack-packets which are
detected and prevented in our proposed algorithm. Fig. 5(i)
shows the simulation results of PDR with various mobility
model. simulation results show A2 enhanced PDR with all
model, due to less BC.
Fig. 5(j) shows simulation results of PDR, TE, and number-
of-attack-packets with two different use cases. In case 1,
middle nodes are mobile and sites nodes are static. Mali-
cious nodes are deployed randomly but static in this case.
In case 2 middle nodes are static, sites nodes are mobile.
The attacker nodes are randomly deployed in this case but
mobile in this case. Simulation results of both cases show
our A2 improved PDR, TE and also detect some attack
packets.
Corollary From Experiment 7: Simulation results clearly
shows that PDR of CMM are greater than all mobility models
and PDR of RWM are minimum relative to other models
(reasons are already given in simulation of RTOC). It is
also clear if malicious nodes are randomly and dynami-
cally deployed so it detection probability increases because
it improved number-of-encounters, which further improved
detection probability. From simulation, this article observed
that TE is increased with simulation time, which also
increased PDR and attack detection. It is clear from a simula-
tion that node walking speed is directly proportional to PDR
(Speed improved number-of-encounters).
4) EXPERIMENT 8
In this experiment, this article shows AL, ABT and OH
with various SE (Test1). Results show that OH and ABT
are improved with our A2, which enhanced PDR, PLR,
TWT, BC, and EC. AL is dis-improve with A2 because IDS
are deployed which checked every packet and create MAC.
Fig. 5(k) shows the simulation results of AL, ABT and OH
with SE.
Corollary From Experiment 8: It is clear from a simulation
that our IFAM improved ABT because it prevents malicious
attacker nodes. BC is minimum so ABT is increased, which
further improved PDR. This article observed from simulation
that SE is inversely related to OH and TWT. This is because
when SE is increased, so nodes quickly died, which decreased
TWT and OH.
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FIGURE 5. Simulation results.
V. HOLISTIC FLOOD ATTACK MITIGATION (HFAM)-A3
Consider a generic attack scenario of malicious nodes
in Fig. 6. There are various innocent nodes. Malicious nodes
target legitimate nodes to overused scarce resources by
launching flood attacks. This article enhanced A2 for the
generic scenario. Before more discussion on A3, this article
takes some assumptions which are followed as.
• An every legitimate node there is agent-based IDS.
• Every IDS generate a same random number (Key).
• Malicious node does not have the ability to create that
key.
Initial Set Up Phase: This article proposed preventive
based mitigation algorithm to thwart flood attacks. In the
initial set up of the networks, every node shares public key
with TA and other nodes. Every node forwards RP to TA for
RLC. TA grant RLC sign with the private key to every node
for a specific time. During initial set up, IDS is deployed in
every node. In IDS there is a databasewhere they store, counts
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FIGURE 6. Flood attack in generic scenario.
packets of each node. IDS generate a unique key which they
append with packets.
Forwarding Phase: Every node appends RLC with sign
packets before forwarding. Every packet pass into IDS. IDS
verify RLC and generate a unique key with SHA 1 algo-
rithm. Every IDS appends key with packets and make a hash
of packets. Actually which is MAC (Hash with Key). IDS
forwards original packets along with MAC, and decrease
count value by 1 in the database. When the receiver IDS
receive packets, they verify sign and RLC. When both sign
and RLC verify, IDS generate same key append with packets
and make a hash of that packets. IDS compare MAC with
original MAC. If verify it means packet (Node) is benign,
no attack is detected, otherwise, attack is detected. IDS
report malicious node to TA, TA forwards sign packets about
malicious nodes in the networks and blacklist the malicious
nodes.
A. CRYPTANALYSIS OF A3
Consider an attacks scenario on A3. If malicious nodes either
bypass IDS or create its own IDS. But in both cases, malicious
nodes are detected because they do not have unique secret
key. Also the proposed algorithm detects colluding malicious
attacker nodes.
B. SIMULATION SET UP
This article simulates HFAM with slightly different parame-
ters used in RTOC and IFAM. This article takes total 20 nodes
with 5 malicious and 15 innocent nodes for A3 in two dif-
ferent groups with 30 wait time interval, group speed 1,
2 and with various mobility model in ONE Simulator. Group
1 contain 15 legitimate nodes, group 2 contain 5 malicious
nodes which launches flood attacks.
C. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section results of A3 are discussed.
Algorithm 3 HFAM-A3 Input: Malicious Packet
Output: Detection/Prevention of Malicious Packets
0 : PhaseOne :
1 : Every node shares Public key with TA and with other
nodes.
2 : Every node send RP to TA for RLC
3 : TA Grant RLC to every nodes according to request
requirement for specific time/Change with a time
PhaseTwo :
4 : if if have a message to forward then
5 : Sign packet and append RLC then forward
6 : else
7 : GO to Step 4
X : End If
PhaseThree :
8 : Sender node IDS Verify RLC
9 : if Verify then
Generate a key append with packet, make hash of
Packets (MAC), Decrease count by 1 in Database
and forward a packet along with MAC.
10 : else
Goto Step 13
X : End If
PhaseFoure : Receiverside
11 : Receiver IDS receive a message
12 : if Verify sender sign, RLC and create MAC of
packets with same Key, Compare both MAC, If verify
then
Node is legitimate, No attack detected
Go to Step 15
else
Attack Detected.
Go to Step 13
X : End If
13 : Report to TA
14 : Create a sign message, forward to all nodes about
malicious node and black list it.
15 : End of algorithm.
1) EXPERIMENT 9
In experiment 9 this article calculated PDR, AL, ABT,
TWT, and BC with various tests. PDR (test1), AL (test2),
ABT (test3) and TWT (test4) with various routing proto-
cols. Also calculated BCwith various simulation time (test5),
BC with various mobility model (test6) and BC with the
different deployment of normal, malicious nodes in scenar-
ios (test7). Fig. 7(a) (test1) shows the simulation results
of PDR. For illustration, this article only shows simulation
results of Epidemic, SprayAndWait, and FirstContact. Simu-
lation results clearly show that when malicious nodes launch
flood attacks, PDR of all routing protocols is decreased.
It is clear from a simulation that our A3 stops malicious
nodes, which enhanced PDR. Fig. 7(b) shows simulation
results of AL. Simulation results show that AL of our HFAM
is dis-improved in case of Epidemic and FirstContact like
RTOC and IFAM (reasons of this is already mentioned in
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RTOC, IFAM simulation results). AL of SprayAndWait is a
little bit improved in our A3, this is because SprayAndWait
spray packets then wait some time, our algorithm stop mali-
cious nodes, drops ratios decreased which enhanced AL.
Fig. 7(c) shows simulation results of ABT. Results show
that proposed A3 enhanced ABT because A3 stops mali-
cious nodes which launches flood attacks. When mali-
cious nodes launch attacks buffer becomes full of malicious
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packets, so it will increase drops ratios (nodes are not avail-
able which decreased ABT). A3 prevent malicious nodes
which enhanced buffer capacity, so packets spend more time
in the buffer which further enhanced PDR. Fig. 7(d) shows
the simulation results of TWT. Simulation results show that
when malicious nodes launch flood attacks so TWT becomes
very high. It is clear form simulation that our A3 prevent
malicious attacks, which ultimately enhanced TWT. Fig. 7(e),
Fig. 7(f) and Fig. 7(g) shows simulation results of BC with
various simulation time, various mobility model and various
deployment of nodes in scenarios respectively. It is clear from
simulation results that our proposed A3 prevent malicious
nodes, which consumed less buffer like RTOC and IFAM.
Which ultimately improved PDR and PLR due to less BC.
This article also deduct from simulation results when mali-
cious nodes are dynamically deployed and normal nodes are
static, so it consumed high amount of buffer relative to others
scenarios. Because malicious nodes move which consumed
buffer of almost every innocent nodes. It is also clear from
simulation when both malicious and normal nodes are static
it consumed less buffer relative to others scenarios. Because
when nodes are static so there is the probability that malicious
nodes consumed buffer of very less number of nodes. When
malicious nodes are static and normal are dynamic so the
probability of BC are less relative to first scenario (in which
malicious are dynamic).
Corollary From Experiment 9: From simulation results,
this article concluded that PDR of the epidemic is mostly
effected relative to other protocols when malicious nodes
launch attacks. Epidemic also consumed more resources
(buffer, TWT and energy) relative to other protocols. PDR
of SprayAndWait is higher than other protocols because it
consumed less buffer which enhanced PDR. It is also clear
from simulation results that AL of FirstContact is high rel-
ative to other protocols because it forwards packets to first
contacted nodes, which takes a long time reached to des-
tination. AL of the epidemic is high relative to SprayAnd-
Wait because epidemic consumed buffer, which causes low
PDR and high PLR. That is why AL of the epidemic is
high due to high PLR. From simulation results, this article
concluded that TWT of the epidemic are higher than other
protocols and TWT of SprayAndWait are less relative to other
protocols.
2) EXPERIMENT 10
As mentioned already in this article that malicious nodes
waste energy resources which cause low PDR and high PLR.
In experiment 10 this article give initial energy 500 and
various SE, SI, TrE (mentioned in the top of every graph) to
test howmuch energy resources are consumed. In experiment
10 this article calculated PDR, TWT, TE, and the number-
of-attack packets with various tests. In test1, test2, test3,
test4 this article calculated previously mentioned parameters
with SE, SI, TrE and various nodes deployment scenarios
respectively. Fig. 7(h) shows simulation results of PDR,
TWT, TE and number-of-attack packets with SE. Simulation
FIGURE 8. PDR, TWT, TE, attacks-packets with SI (test2).
results show that all mentioned parameters are improved in
our A3, because A3 prevent malicious nodes which enhanced
PDR, TWT (A3 consumed fewer energy that is why PDR
and TWT are improved). It is also clear from simulation
results that TE with A3 is less relative to malicious sce-
nario (a scenario in which malicious nodes launch attacks),
which proves A3 stops some certain malicious nodes and its
malicious packets. Fig. 8 shows simulation results with SI.
Simulation results show that all parameters are improvedwith
our A3 like test1. Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 shows simulation results
of previously mentioned parameters with TrE and various
nodes deployment scenarios respectively. Simulation results
show PDR, TWT, and TE are improved with our proposed
A3 like test1 and test2 (reasons are already mentioned that
our A3 consumed less energy, which improved nodes life-
time). Simulation results of test3 imply that PDR is decreased
with TrE, However after some time, it increased (when TrE
increased from 0.1 to 0.2 it decreased PDR, but when TrE
increased from 0.2 to 0.3 PDR increased). This is because of
the facts when nodes consumed more TrE (especially mali-
cious nodes) so malicious nodes become down, that is why
after some time PDR is increased (maintain stable graph). It is
also clear from a simulation of test4 whenmalicious nodes are
static and normal is dynamic so TWT is high. Because when
normal is dynamic and malicious are static, so malicious
nodes affect less number of legitimate nodes, legitimate nodes
forwards packets, that is why TWT are high. When malicious
nodes are dynamic and normal nodes are static, so TWT are
low. Becausemalicious nodes consumed buffer of every node,
so innocent nodes quickly become down. That is why benign
nodes forward less number of packets, so TWT are less in
this case. When both malicious and benign nodes are static
so it consumed more bandwidth because nodes forward large
number of packets (Nodes lifetime are improved, the proba-
bility of nodes, lifetime improved due to less probability of
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FIGURE 9. PDR, TWT, TE, attack-packets with TrE (test3).
FIGURE 10. PDR, TWT, TE, attack-packets with nodes deployment (test4).
attacks on every benign node (attacks are successful in few
numbers of nodes)).
Corollary From Experiment 10: This article concluded
from experiment 10 that SE is inversely related to PDR,
TWT and TE. When nodes consumed more energy so nodes
quickly become dead which decreased PDR, TWT, and TE
(nodes died due to EC so the number of transmitted pack-
ets becomes less which decreased TWT and TE). It is also
cleared from simulation results that SI is directly related to
PDR, TWT, and TE (nodes scan after long time so energy
is less consumed). When SI is high so it consumed less
energy, which implies that nodes forwardmore packets which
improved PDR. Also when nodes forward more packets
due to less EC (long lifetime) so TWT and TE will be
increased.
FIGURE 11. Flood attack in two sites/city scenario.
VI. COMPARISON
A. DETECTION RATE/DETECTION ACCURACY
This article compared the simulation results (Detection Rate)
of RTOC, IFAM, and HFAM with article [36] (Li article)
and article [48] (FDER). Fig. 11 shows simulation results of
Detection Rate. Simulation results show that Detection Rate
is linearly increased when the number of claims (In case
of RTOC) and the number of messages (In case of IFAM
and HFAM) are increased. Simulation results of Detection
Rate show that Detection Rate is high with Forward rout-
ing protocol as compare to SprayAndWait. This is because
SprayAndWait take some time after spray phase (due to
disconnection probability of detection are decreased) and
forward algorithm forwards packets to those nodes which
have high probability with destination, so obviously, forward
routing protocol increased Detection Rate.
Simulation results shows that the Detection Rate of our
proposed RTOC is a little bit enhanced as compared to Li
algorithms. This is just because of the facts that RTOC
compress packets, which take more time in buffer (ABT are
high already proved in the simulation section, because BC
is less, drops probability becomes less). Detection Rate of
Li [36] is low because it waste buffer actually drops prob-
ability are high, so most of the time claims packets are
drops (due to buffer overloading) without malicious nodes
detection. Simulation results shows that our proposed A2 and
A3 enhanced Detection Rate (IDS directly blacklist those
malicious nodes which violate Rate limit) as compared to
Li algorithm and FDER. This is because our proposed algo-
rithms do not send extra information (Claims in Li algorithm
and Encounter history in FDER) along with packets and
does not cross-check packets claims and encounter history.
Obviously claims verification and encounter history sharing
took a long time so Detection Rate is not high. Detection
accuracy does not hundred percent in A2 this is just because
of intermittent connectivity. Detection Rate of A3 is a little
bit higher than A2, this is because, A2 some time forwards
packets to ordinary nodes, in-contrast A3 only forwards to
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FIGURE 12. Flood attack in two sites/city scenario.
IDS based nodes, which directly blacklist malicious nodes.
Nonetheless, A2 and A3 have the ability to detect colluding
attacks (In which the malicious nodes collaborate to launch
flood attacks) but it took some time.
B. DETECTION DELAY
This article compared the simulation results of RTOC, IFAM,
andHFAMwith FDER algorithm. Fig. 12 shows the results of
Detection Delay. Simulation results show that RTOC, IFAM,
and HFAM enhanced Detection Delay. Actually, FDER for-
wards encounters history to others nodes, then cross check
encounter history. However, due to the disruption, it took
a long time to verify encounter history and also encounter
history waste buffer, so packet drops ratios are high (Most of
the time encounter history packets are drops without attacks
detection due to buffer overloading). In contrast, RTOC com-
press packets which consumed less buffer relative to FDER,
so drops ratios are less in RTOC. That is why RTOC little bit
improved Detection Delay.
A2 and A3 do not cross-check claims and share encounter
history, However, when nodes violate rate limit, IDS directly
black-list malicious nodes. So Detection Delay of A2 and
A3 are improved relative to RTOC and FDER. Detection
Delay of A3 is improved more relative to A2, because A2 for-
wards packets to both ordinary nodes and IDS based nodes,
so detection takes some more time when nodes forward pack-
ets to ordinary nodes. In contrast A3 only forwards packets to
IDS based nodes, which quickly detects malicious nodes.
C. MISCELLANEOUS PARAMETERS
This article simulates various parameters in the simulation
section, which are already mentioned. Simulation results
shows that our proposed RTOC, IFAM and HFAM enhanced
resources consumption (BC, EC, and BWC this is because
of Huff-man coding in RTOC, IFAM and HFAM do not
send extra-information along with packets that are claims and
encounter history) which ultimately improved PDR, PLR,
ABT, TWT, BC and OH. Simulation results show that AL
is dis-improved. PDR, PLR, ABT, TWS, BC, EC and OH etc
are not shown in the article [48] (FDER) and [36] (Li) that
is why this article does not compare the above mentioned
parameters. However, this is already proved in analysis and
simulation section that our proposed algorithms enhanced the
above-mentioned parameters.
D. COST ANALYSIS
Cost is very important parameters for security. For every
security attacks detection, cost is required, without cost,
security is impossible. This section analytically analyzed
that how much cost is required to detect malicious nodes
which launches flood attacks. Consider a rate limit based
algorithms [36], encounter-based [48] and our proposed
RTOC, IFAM and HFAM. All algorithms detect malicious
nodeswith some cost. Generically there are three types of cost
which are followed as, Communication Cost (CC), Compu-
tational Cost (CMC) and Storage Cost (SC)
Cost = CC + CMC + SC (27)
1) COMMUNICATION COST
Some of the proposed algorithms forwards some extra infor-
mation (mentioned already in this article) along with packets
to detect malicious nodes. Which consumed some extra com-
munication resources (Communication Cost). The amount of
extra communication cost required for detection of malicious
nodes is called communication cost. In sender side, rate
limit based and RTOC forwards P-Claim with new packets
and T-Claim with every packet. In receiver side, receiver
nodes cross check packets claims. So in rate limit based
and RTOC, CC is equal to the sum of the communication
of packets claims and claims verification. If the number of
new packets is (NNP), the number of intermediate relayed
packets is (NRP) and Claim Verification cost is (CVC), then
CS of rate limit based and RTOC will be calculated with the
following formula.
CC = NNP * P-Claim + NRP * T-Claim + RLC + CVC
(28)
Encounter-based algorithm (FDER) share sender encounter
history and receiver nodes verify encounter history. If num-
ber of encounter-history cost is (NEHC) and verifica-
tion of encounter-history is (VEHC) Therefore CS of the
encounter-based algorithm (FDER) will be calculated with
the following formula.
CC = (NEHC) + RLC + (VEHC) (29)
A2 only send rate limit certificate along with packets. So CC
of A2 will be calculated with the following formula.
CC = (NNP)* RLC + (NRP)* RLC (30)
A3 forwards rate limit certificate and MAC along with pack-
ets. However, the Mac is very small relative to packet claims
and encounter history. According to the analytical analysis of
this article, the CC of A3 will be calculated with a following
formula.
CC = (NNP) * (RLC +MAC) + (NRP) * (RLC +MAC)
(31)
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Above all equations clearly shows that CS of A2 is minimum
because it only sends RLC with packets. CS of encounter
based algorithms are maximum because it sends encounter
history and verify encounter history, rate limit based and
RTOC send P-Claim and T-Claim but claims packets are very
small so the cost of that is lower than encounter history.
Also, CS of RTOC is lower than original rate limit based (Li
scheme) because RTOC forwards compress packets. CC of
HFAM is a little bit high than RTOC because it forwards
MAC along with packets, which consumed more communi-
cation resources than RTOC.
2) COMPUTATION COST
The amount of cost required for extra works before sending
of packets is called CMC. CMC of all algorithms is different.
Consider a rate-limit-based algorithm (Li scheme) which
create P-Claim, T-Claim, create a signature and verify the
signature. If Claims Creation Cost is (CLC), Claims Ver-
ification Cost is (CLV), Signature Creation Cost is (SCC)
and Signature Verification Cost is (SVC) then cost will be
calculated with a following formula.
CMC = CLC + SCC + SVC (32)
If packet compression cost is (PCC) then CMC of RTOC will
be calculated with the following formula.
CMC = PCC + CLC + SCC + SVC (33)
Encounter-based algorithm only create signature and verify
signature so CMC will be calculated as follow as.
CMC = SCC + SVC (34)
If MAC creation cost is MCC and MAC verification Cost is
MVC then CMC of A3 will be followed as.
CMC = MCC + SCC + SVC +MVC (35)
A2 only sign packets so CMC of A2 is almost negligible,
CMC of RTOC is maximum due to compression, claims, and
signature creation/verification. CMC of A3 will be a little bit
high than IFAM (RTOC need PCC and HFAM need MCC
and MVC).
3) STORAGE COST
The time average extra information store along with packets
are called storage Cost. Rate limit based (Li scheme) only
stores packets claims along with packets. RTOC stores pack-
ets claims along with packets, but its storage cost is less than
Li because it consumed minimum buffer due to compression.
Encounter-based algorithm (FDER) stores encounter history
information, which consumed a slightly greater amount of
buffer than rate limit and RTOC. HFAM forwardsMAC along
with packets which consumed some buffer (BC are very less
relative to others schemes). The SC of IFAM is minimum
relative to all because it does not store any other information
that is why it improved PDR and PLR (already proved in
analysis and simulation section).
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Flood attack is serious and very challenging threat in DTNs
security. Being a serious threat, flood mitigation is very
important to tackle limited resources of DTNs. This article
analyse flood attacks with various parameters rigorously,
which enable us to modify one existing rate-limit-based
algorithm which slightly improved PDR, detection rate and
detection time. This article also proposed two distributed
resources efficient algorithms, which are suitable for DTNs
to mitigate misbehaving nodes. Simulation results shows
that proposed algorithms mitigates misbehaving nodes, save
scarce resources which improved PDR and PLR, detection
time and detection rate. Simulation results clearly shows
that our A1 improved PDR almost 18, 2 and 3-11 per-
cent with Epidemic, DirectlyDelivery and DD1 respec-
tively with test 1. Simulation results shows 14-25, 2-5 and
6-13 percent improvement with Epidemic, DirectDelivery
and DD1 respectively with test 2. Simulation results also
clearly shows that our A2 and A3 improved PDR 30, 22, 25,
and 20 percent with SprayAndWait, FirstContact, Epidemic
and DirectDelivery respectively.
From simulation results, this article concluded that PDR
is directly related to SI and inversely related to SE. This is
because when SI is high so nodes consume less energy which
increase PDR. Also if SE is high so PDR is decreased because
nodes waste maximum energy. This decreased nodes lifetime
consequently, which ultimately causes low PDR. It is clear
from simulation results that encounter is inversely propor-
tional to SE when we increase SE so TE is decreased, which
decrease PDR. From simulation results, this article conclude
that PDR is inversely related to BC. It is very clear from
simulation results that detection probability is high when
malicious nodes are randomly deployed. It is also clear from
simulation results that PDR of the CMM model are high and
RWM is low that is why number of encounters are high in
CMM due to less transmission area. Simulation results also
show that epidemic consume more resources (bandwidth,
buffer, and energy) relative to other protocols. Resources con-
sumption of direct delivery protocol is minimum as compared
to other protocols.
This article analyse that researcher’s proposed some tra-
ditional methods (Not suitable in DTNs) to detect malicious
nodes which launch flood attacks. This article recommends
IDS based detection algorithms because IDS based meth-
ods are cheapest, suitable to DTNs. According to analy-
sis, flood mitigation is a very tough task, so this article
proposes, why the researchers do not use preventive-based-
algorithms. According to the analysis of this article, why
the researchers do not detect malicious packets rather than
malicious nodes. This article recommends detection of mali-
cious packets rather than malicious nodes. According to the
analysis of this article machine-learning-based algorithms are
very powerful to detect malicious packets. This article rec-
ommended, if researchers propose machine-learning-based
algorithms, it will be a cheapest and suitable solution (which
will enhance detection time and detection accuracy) in DTNs.
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This article proposed RTOCwhich enhance resources con-
sumption, PDR and detection time. However, RTOC detects
malicious nodes with cross-checking strategies (traditional
approach), which obviously takes time. DTNs require algo-
rithms which quickly detect malicious nodes and save scarce
resources. This article proposed IFAM which improved
detection time, detection accuracy, resources consumption,
and PDR. However, IFAM is applicable to a specific scenario.
This article proposed HFAM for a generic scenario which
according to analysis and simulation results, is not a bad solu-
tion. However, it verify packets with same key. If researchers
propose algorithms which can verify packets with a different
key, or propose some other methods for packets verification,
so it will be the better solution.
Hopefully, this article will further motivate researchers
interest in this particular security research area and accord-
ingly highlight the following directions for investigation.
1) Algorithms which verify packets in the destination
without the same key used in HFAM.
2) Relationship of parameters and constants used in the
analysis.
3) Distributed algorithms to mitigate flood attacks,
enhance resources consumption, detection accuracy,
detection time and PDR.
4) Preventive based algorithms to thwart flood causing
malicious nodes.
5) Machine learning based algorithms which detect mali-
cious packets rather than malicious nodes, which
enhance detection accuracy and overcomes false pos-
itive and false negative ratios.
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